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Abstract. Governments usually guarantee the amount of investment income to private sector partners to encourage their
participation in Public-Private Partnership urban infrastructure development projects, with the ‘float return on investment
guarantee’ being the main method in use by the Chinese government today. The current problems with the float return on
investment guarantee are analysed and a guarantee approach with embedded motivatio nal behaviour is presented as an
alternative. A pricing method option is then introduced as the motivation-embedded return guarantee has similar characteristics to real options. From this, a valuation model is developed that provides the basis of a new systematic method
for calculating the government guarantee value.
Keywords: urban infrastructure, government guarantee, real options, motivation behaviour.

Introduction
For a long time, much needed infrastructure development
in developing countries and emerging markets has been
greatly restricted due to lack of finance (Chen 2002), and
China is no exception (Pan, Ma 2007). Since the mid1990s, Chinese urbanisation has developed rapidly, growing at around one per cent per year. By the end of 2012,
China’s urban population had accounted for over 52 per
cent of the county’s total population (National Bureau of
Statistics of China 2013), with approximately 71 million
city dwellers. As a result, the social demand for urban
infrastructure has increased rapidly and it is predicted
that the aggregate investment needed in Chinese urban
infrastructure from 2011 to 2015 will be between 20 trillion and 36 trillion RMB (Beilin 2013) (1 USD = 6.1895
RMB in December 2014). The debt caused by urban infrastructure projects by 2010, however, was estimated to
be 86.5 per cent of all of Chinese local government debts,
with 79.01 per cent of that being in bank loans (National
Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China 2011).
This suggests that government financial support alone is
unlikely to be sufficient to meet the demands on China’s

urban infrastructure capital. Some external contribution is
therefore needed, making it necessary to attract foreign
capital and domestic non-government capital. An increasingly popular approach to this is through the collaboration of local governments and private investors by Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) such as BOT, TOT, PFI,
DBFO (Van Ham, Koppenjan 2002).
Urban infrastructure projects also have long construction and operation periods that involve many risks in
their financing, construction, operation and maintenance
(Grimsey, Lewis 2002; Ahwireng-Obeng, Mokgohlwa
2002), and PPPs provide a structured collaboration model
for risks, costs and income to be shared or reassigned by
the public sector and private investors by using long-term
contracts (Lehman, Tregoning 2004). In doing this, and
in order to attract foreign and domestic non-government
capital, China’s host governments provide a guaranteed
minimum return on investment (ROI) to private investors to reduce their risk and encourage their involvement
(Ceran 2002; Fan et al. 2007).
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The prospects of obtaining at least a reasonable return is an essential prerequisite to motivate investors, but
profit may be acquired through monopoly management of
investors due to the monopolistic nature of urban infrastructure. It is therefore necessary for the government to
restrict investors’ income caused by a monopolistic situation. The government has the right to share high-expected
project returns. To do this in PPPs in China, in addition to
setting a minimum ROI for the private investor, the local
government sets a maximum ROI too.
These ROI guarantees provided by the Chinese government embody three aspects: concessionary management, ROI and investment climate (Feng, Ju-e 2008; Luo
2008; Wang et al. 2006). The minimum ROI guarantee,
in particular, is very important for private investors and
the most effective in attracting non-government capital
investors (Guo-an et al. 2004; Sun et al. 2007; Xia, Li
2009). A fixed ROI guarantee or disguised fixed ROI is
banned by the central Chinese government (State Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China et al.
1995; Ministry of Construction of the People’s Republic of China 2005; National Development and Reform
Commission of China et al. 2015), so the ROI of urban
infrastructure projects in China can only be the float ROI
method. This means that the local government reaches an
agreement with project company on the upper and lower
limits of their ROI (Li-na 2004). When the actual ROI is
beyond the upper limit, the income caused by the extra
ROI is taken by the government as revenue, but all the
income goes to the project company when the actual ROI
is below the upper limit and the government compensates
the project company when it is below the lower limit.
The method does create motivational problems
though, as the compensation provided to underperforming companies with low actual ROIs offers little incentive
to improve. Similarly, the cap on high ROIs provides no
incentive to perform any higher. This paper presents a
return guarantee approach with embedded motivational
behaviour aimed at correcting this situation. With this
approach, project company earning below the set minimum ROI are reimbursed if this is due to government
policy, while those earning above the set maximum ROI
are provided with an inducement (such as a tax break) to
continue doing so. Because this approach has two threshold mechanisms, this paper studies this form of government motivation-embedded return guarantee based on
barrier option theory.

1. Literature review
Early studies of government guarantees began with the
free cash flow (FCF) method. Its main defect, however,
is an inability to capture the flexibility of project management and strategic interaction, which has been gradually exposed with the development of risk management
theory. Hayes and Garvin (1982) realized that, when the
discounted cash flow (DCF) method was used to analyse
projects containing great uncertainties, it can underesti-
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mate investment opportunity – leading to shortsighted
decision-making or underinvestment. Myers (1990), who
first proposed the adjusted present value (APV) approach,
observed that the DCF method had inherent limitations
when it was used to evaluate strategic management options or huge investment risks. Both the DCF and APV
methods are developed from the FCF method and they
can therefore be classified as FCF-based methods. FCFbased methods have special characteristics in pricing
guarantee values. The first is typically considering invest
processes as reversible. This means the investments could
be recouped if actual profit is lower than anticipated profit. But the facts, however, indicate that most investments
are irreversible (Eschenbach et al. 2007). The second
characteristic is supposing there is only one chance to
make an investment decision and the investment opportunity cannot be postponed. This means that investment
decision makers are only passive selectors and cannot
change their decisions in the project life time. There are,
however, many opportunities to make or change decisions
in the project life time (Han, Park 2008). If decision makers are uncertain about the project foreground, they can
postpone the investment until they obtain more information to make decisions for next stage. FCF-based methods neglect the time or chance selectivity of investment
decisions. The third characteristic of FCF-based methods
is accurately forecasted of net cash flows. One of their
important prerequisites is that net cash flows at each time
point can be forecasted accurately. In an uncertain investment environment, net cash flows are hard to calculate
accurately. FCF-based methods neglect the uncertainty
of projects. Because of these characteristics, FCF-based
methods work well for a short-term project, but may lead
an incorrect decision with a long-term project. Urban infrastructure projects always have long-term life cycle
with different stages, uncertainties and high risks and are
therefore unsuitable for FCF-based methods. As Myers
(1990) points out, the option method has an obvious potential for use with long-term, uncertain projects.
The first application of the option method in the value of guarantees was by Merton (1977), who evaluated
loan guarantees provided by the U.S. government. Real
options (ROs) methods have been developed as option
methods sometimes do not work well when guaranteed
subjects have no real trades and their prices are discrete.
Jones and Mason (1980) have constructed a value equation for loan guarantees using a ROs method from the
perspective of government guarantees for an enterprise’s
preferred debt and junior debt in the belief that the fiscal
cost of government could be reduced through regulating
the proportion of these two types of debt. Zhang (1999)
calculated the value of the full guarantee, partial guarantee and debt guarantee using the real option method.
Zhang et al. (2006) established a value model for government guarantees for float ROI and purchasing agreements. These studies examined the pricing of government
guarantees from different perspectives and assume the
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guarantee period to be equated with the concession period. However, concessionaires cannot settle with the government until the end of the concessionary period, which
means the government guarantees are executed many
times during the concession period. In China, guarantees
are always executed annually, based on demand quantity
or return. Considering the characteristics of the float ROI,
this paper takes the time node when ROI reaches the upper/lower limit designated in the contract as the execution
time of guarantees, as shown in Figure 1. Thus, construction times are reduced; effectively motivating increased
investor enthusiasm and business creativity, so the level
of guarantees can be reduced accordingly. Hence, government financial risk is also reduced (Li et al. 2011).

than R2 by increasing cost or other ways that cause
unnecessary waste, reduce operational efficiency,
and affect the quality of urban infrastructure provision (Zhang, Guo 2009).
In this paper, we propose a motivation-embedded
ROI guarantee method aimed at solving these problems.
With this new approach, the project company is compensated for an ROI > 0 below R1 only if it is due to
government policy, otherwise the company must carry
its own losses. In addition, when the ROI exceeds R2,
the government motivates the project company to some
extent, such as by a reduced amount of taxation on the
company’s general revenue.

2. Methodology
2.1. Theory selection

Fig. 1. Float return guarantee

In Figure 1, the solid line indicates the actual ROI of
the project company, R1 and R2 indicate the lower and upper limits of ROI respectively, such that the ROI is never
less than R1 and never more than R2, with the government
making up any deficit below R1 in time [0, T1] and extracting any surplus above R2 in time [T2, T3].
1. Float ROI changes the expected return of investors
and redistributes project risk through adjusting the
upper and lower returns of investment. If the range
of float ROIs could not be properly controlled, the
government would have a contingent liability. Although the liability is not paid immediately, there
is still an estimated liability for the government. If
the ROI lower limit (R1) is set too high and cannot match the government’s ability to pay, the government will face considerable financial pressure
(Houskamp, Tynan 2000; Mody, Patro 1996).
2. Non-government investors inevitably require increases of R2. If the R2 is too high for the project
company to achieve, the government loses control
of the guarantee. However, if the R2 is low, the nongovernment investors have less incentive to invest.
3. An underperforming project company may just settle for R1 and continue to underperform, which increases financial pressure on the government (Alonso-Conde et al. 1997; Mody, Lewis 1997).
4. Parting with the surplus above R2disincentivises the
project company to seek a ROI above R2. The project company may even keep the actual return lower

ROs have three typical characteristics of being uncertain,
time-selective and irreversible (Wong 2007). With the
government granting franchise rights to project company,
urban infrastructure projects also have these three typical characteristics. After the first phase franchise, if the
products or services provided by project company meet
the requirements of the government, the project company will have the right to decide whether to continue the
franchise rights after they forecast future market changes.
Future market changes involve the uncertain selection of
franchise rights representing time-selection. If the project
company decide to continue the franchise and renew the
contract with the government, it will continue to invest
in urban infrastructure projects. This is because, with the
long operation period involved, most of the investment
results in fixed assets that have low fluidity and all or part
of the investment is irreversible.
Under such uncertain conditions, the government’s
franchise guarantee is a growth option which is one kind
of real options. When the first franchise right expires and
the production or services provided by the project company meet the government’s requirements, the project
company has the option of the franchise right for a limited period. If the project company forecast a profit, their
preference is to exercise the option as it is a growth option (Kulatilaka, Perotti 1998). This option causes asymmetry in the gains and losses of the project company. If
the uncertainties are conducive to a positive direction, the
project company will exercise the option to obtain greater
benefits. Otherwise, the project company will abandon
the option to avoid making a greater loss. The government guarantee can provide future investment opportunities for the project company. This is of great significance
to project company (Chiara et al. 2007). Therefore, we
use growth option theory to study the government guarantee.
2.2. Description of value changes
Geometric Brownian motion is a special Markov process
and is widely used to describe security prices in standard finance theory. Although there are some limitations,
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empirical studies show that geometric Brownian motion
can describe project prices changes well between 70 to 80
years (Luenberger 1998; Jing et al. 2012). Both project
value and project price are identically distributed over a
long period, as project value is a result of the mean reversion of project price over time. Because of the long
period of time taken in the construction and operation
of urban infrastructure projects, the difference between
the mean reversion results of projects prices and projects
values is only marginal. More importantly, geometric
Brownian motion can provide an analytical solution that
can be used to determine the effects on real option values
and government guarantee decisions caused by uncertainties (Mulvey et al. 1997).
Geometric Brownian motion can be expressed by:
dx (=
t ) adt + bdz ,

(1)

where a and b are constants.
The drift rate and variance rate are assumed to be
constant in geometric Brownian motion. These two rates
in the value change process are functions of time t so that,
according to the ITO process:
=
dx a ( x, t ) dt + b ( x, t ) dz ,

(2)

where the drift rate of x is a and the variance rate of a
is b2.
According to the ITO theorem, the value, V, is a
function of time t, from the following procedure:

 ∂V
∂V 1 ∂ 2V 2 
∂V
+
dV= 
a+
b  dt +
bdz ,
2
 ∂x

∂
∂
t
x
2
∂
x


where the drift rate of V is (

(3)

 ∂F
∂F 1 ∂ 2 F 2 2 
∂F
∆=
µP +
+
σ P  ∆t +
σP∆z ,
F 
2
 ∂P

∂
∂P
t
2
∂P



where dz and ∆z are random disturbance terms.
To remove the random disturbance term and construct a risk-free investment portfolio, a risk investment
portfolio Π is constructed with government guarantee F
and project value P:
Π
= –F +

2

2.3. Pricing model
Project value P follows geometric Brownian motion and
therefore:
dP
= µdt + σdz ,
P

∆Π =–∆F+

 ∂F
∂F 1 ∂ 2 F 2 2 
∂F
=
+
dF 
µP +
σ P  dt + σ Pdz .
2
 ∂P

∂t 2 ∂P
∂P



(5)

The discrete forms of Eqns (4) and (5) are:

∆P = µP + σP∆t ;

(6)

(8)

∂F
∆P .
∂P

(9)

Substituting Eqns (6) and (7) into Eqn (9):
∆Π =(–

∂F 1 ∂ 2 F 2 2
σ P )∆t .
–
∂t 2 ∂P 2

(10)

There is no random disturbance term ∆z in Eqn (4)
and hence after ∆t time the Π must be a risk-free investment portfolio:

∆Π = r Π∆t ,

(11)

where r is the risk-free interest rate.
Substituting Eqns (8) and (9) into Eqn (11):

 ∂F 1 ∂ 2 F 2 2 
∂F 

−
σ P  ∆t = r  − F +
P  ∆t. (12)
 −
2

∂P 

 ∂t 2 ∂P

After transformation, Eqn (12) can be expressed by:
∂F ∂F
1 2 2 ∂2 F
σ P
+ rP
+
− rF =
0,
2
∂P ∂t
2
∂P

(13)

which is the celebrated Black-Scholes equation (Black,
Scholes 1973). According to the basic theory of ROs
(Black, Scholes 1973), the expected value of the growth
option on the expiry date is max ( PT − C , 0 ) , where PT
is the project value on the expiry date and C is the initial investment cost. After solving Eqn (13), the pricing
equation is:

(4)

where P is the project value; µ is the expected rate of return of the project; σ is the variance of the expected rate
of return, which represents the uncertainty of the return,
and dz is a random disturbance term.
From Eqn (3), the growth option of project F is:

∂F
P.
∂P

After ∆t time, the risk investment portfolio is:

∂V
∂V 1 ∂ 2V 2
+
a+
b ) and
∂x
∂t 2 ∂x 2

 ∂V  2
the variance rate of V is ( 
 b ). This is used to cal ∂x 
culate project value.

(7)

=
F PN ( d1 ) − Ce − rT N ( d 2 ) ,
where:

2
ln( P ) +  r + σ
C 
2
d1 =
σ T

(14)


T
 ;

2
ln( P ) +  r − σ  T
C 
2
d2 =
= d1 − σ T ;
σ T

and N ( x ) is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution.
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2.4. ROI changes
Urban infrastructure provides basic services and the general foundation of the urban economy, social development
and people’s lives. It is the primary condition for city survival and development and the material basis of urban
economic development (Ministry of Housing and UrbanRural Development of China 1999). The service/production price of urban infrastructure has a direct impact on
the economics of local government and local government
has the right and ability to keep control of the price (Stark
1974). As mentioned in Tam’s study (1999), project companies have little chance of adjusting price when in the
process of negotiation or operation. The Chinese government has developed a series of laws and regulations to
prevent project companies acquiring huge profits. These
laws and regulations can be divided into three levels. The
top-level laws are the Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s
Republic of China (Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress of China 2007) and the Pricing Law
of the People’ Republic of China (Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress of China 1997), which
stipulates that infrastructure service/production must be
priced by government. Project companies have the right
to advise on the price but this must within a reasonable
range of the government guidance price. The second level
regulations comprise the Measures Concerning Curbing
the Making of Exorbitant Profits (State Council of the
People’s Republic of China 2011) and Prohibition of Acts
of Price Monopoly Tentative Provisions (National Development and Reform Commission of China 2003). These
stipulate that the profits for infrastructure service/production must within a reasonable range of the average profits
made in the same region, at the same time and with the
grade. Based on these two regulations, every province in
China has guidance prices for different regions. The third
level regulations consist of the Financial Guideline for
Government and Public-Private Partnership (Ministry of
Finance of China 2015) and Guideline on Carrying out
Public-Private-Partnership (National Development and
Reform Commission of China 2014), which stipulate
that the profit rates for infrastructure service/production
should be based on the medium and long term lending
rates of commercial banks. Therefore, all project companies in China have profit rates that are within the range
of the government guidelines and it is not possible for
them to make any huge profits. As a result, this study
makes the assumption that project ROI is always lower
than the upper limit of ROI. This simplifies the boundary
condition for the government guarantee value model and
reflects the reality of the situation.

3. Model construction
Suppose the loss of the project company is caused by
government policy, the return level of the project company during concessionary time is lower than the secondary threshold R’. This is shown in Figure 2, where the
solid line indicates the actual ROI of the project com-

pany. Supposing the motivation threshold value is R0; the
government motivation level is R+; and R* is the actual
ROI after motivation, so R* = R + R+, where 0 < R0 < 1,
0 < R+ < 1, R > R0.

Fig. 2. Motivation-embedded ROI guarantee

When the project company is in time interval [0,
T1), the actual ROI of the project company is less than 0,
which means that the project company is operating at loss
due to the public welfare policy of the government. In
this case, the government subsidises the project company
to assure its received ROI is at least 0. In time interval
[T1, T2), the ROI is between 0 and R0 and the project
company obtains the actual ROI. In time interval [T2, T3),
as the actual ROI of the project company is more than
the threshold value – R0, the government should provide
some motivation (e.g. tax preference) to give the project
company additional R+ ROI so the project company receives a final ROI of R* (R* = R + R+). In this way, the
project company is incentivised to make a high actual
ROI and avoid making a low actual ROI without the possibility of making a loss or huge profit.
3.1. Model description
The government guarantee value is a function of project
income V, and time t, F (V, t) is the government guarantee value with embedded motivational behaviour. F (V, t)
can be expressed as:

, t) 0
(0 ≤ t ≤ T )
 F (V=
R'

(VR0 < V < VR' , 0 ≤ t ≤ T )
 F (V , t ) =λV

(0 ≤ t ≤ T )
R0 , t ) 0
 F (V=

F=
(V , t )  F=
(V , t ) 0
(0 < V < VR0 , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) .

=
(0 ≤ t ≤ T )
 F (0, t ) 0
 F (V , t ) =−V
(VR− < V < 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T )

 F (VR− , t ) =−VR− (0 ≤ t ≤ T )

		
(15)
Supposing the project return V conforms to geometric Brownian motion, then:

dV
= µdt + σdz ,
V

(16)
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where V is the project return; μ is the expected return
 1 2 2 ∂2 F
∂F ∂F
on project investment; and σ is the variance of expected
0
+ rV
+
− rF =
 σV
2
2
V ∂t
∂
∂V

return, which represents the uncertainty of the expected

*
return. Supposing F is some call option of the=
project, F
(VR− < V ≤ 0) . (21)
 F (V , T ) F (V , T )
is the function of V and t and satisfies the Black-Scholes

0≤t ≤T
=
 F (VR− , t ) 0
equation according to the ITO theorem:


∂F ∂F
1 2 2 ∂2 F
(17)
σV
+ rV
+
− rF =
0.
∂V ∂t
2
Let G (U , t ) = F (V , t ) , U = −V , then:
∂V 2
Considering the boundary conditions, the govern2r
− +1
 U  σ2
ment guarantee of investment has the following option
− r ( T −t )
G (U , t ) Ie
N ( d 4 )] −
[ N ( d2 ) −  −
=

characteristics:
 VR 
− 

1. When the project return is in interval [ VR− , 0], the
2r
project company actually obtains a put option, which
− +1
 U  σ2
comes into effect when V = 0 and becomes invalid
U [( d1 ) −  −
N ( d3 )],

 VR 
when V reaches VR− .
− 

2. When the project return V reaches VR0 , suppos		
(22)
ing the project company cannot obtain huge profits
where:
(meaning the project return cannot reach VR′ ), the
project company actually obtains a call option.
σ2 
1 
If the government provides embedded motivational
ln   −  r +
 (T − t )
2 
 U  
behaviour guarantees for a project with M years of con, d 2= d1 + σ T − t ,
d1 =
cessionary time, there will be many European call and put
σ T −t
options during the concessionary time – even though the
government only signs one contract with the project comU *I  
σ2 
pany – because of the guarantee of annual fulfilment. Euln  2  −  r +
 (T − t )
 VR  
2 
ropean options and American options are two main styles
− 

, d 4= d3 + σ T − t .
d3 =
of options. A European option may be exercised only at
σ T −t
the expiration date of the option, while an American option may be exercised at any time before the expiration
Substituting U = −V in equation:
date. Because the project company will make a choice to
exercise or not to exercise the option at the end of each
2r

− 2 +1
fiscal year, the options are European-style options.


σ

U
F=
(V , t ) G=
(U , t ) Ie− r (T −t )  N ( d 2 ) −  − 
V is the current value of the urban infrastructure proV

 R− 
ject return, and I is the initial investment, then the value

of the put option obtained by the project company is:
2r

− 2 +1
,


1
σ

U
=
F
max(−V , 0)
(18)
N ( d 4 ) ]−U [ N ( d1 ) −  −
N ( d3 )  =

 VR 

− 


where –V means the project company is operating at a
loss due to the public welfare policy of the government.
2r
− 2 +1
The value of call option is then:


σ
V
− r T −t
Ie ( ) [ Nd 6 − 
N ( d8 ) ]+V [ N ( d5 ) −



2
V
=
F
max(λV , 0).
(19)
 R− 
2r


− +1
 V ) σ2 N ( d )  ,
(23)
7
3.2. Solution of the put option
 VR

−


F * (V , t ) is the standard put option value, which will bewhere
come invalid when V reaches VR− . When V = VR− the
boundary condition is:
σ2 
 I 
ln  −  −  r +
 (T − t )
F (VR− , t ) = 0 .
(20)
2 
 V  
; d 6= d5 + σ T − t ;
d5 =
σ T −t
Solving the following model in region { V ≤ V ≤ V ,

0 ≤ t ≤ T }:

R−

R0

960

Q. Man et al. Government motivation-embedded return guarantee for urban infrastructure projects based on real options

 V *I  
σ2
ln  − 2  −  r +
 VR  
2
− 
d7 = 
σ T −t


 (T − t )


 V *I  
σ2
ln  − 2  −  r +
 VR  
2
− 
d3 = 
σ T −t

; d=
d7 + σ T − t .
8

{

}

 1 2 2 ∂2 F
∂F ∂F
+ rV
+
− rF
= 0, V ≥ VR0 , 0 ≤ t ≤ T
 σV
2
∂
2
V ∂t
∂
V


, T ) max ( λV , 0 ) ,
 F (V=

 F VR0 , t= 0, ( 0 ≤ t ≤ T )

		
(24)
After solving Eqn (24), the call option value is:

(

(

=
d1

)

)

F (V , t ) = λVN ( d1 ) ,

where

1
+ ( K + 1) =
2τ
2τ 2

x

(25)

1 

ln V +  r + σ2  (T − t )
2 

.
σ T −t

3.4. Comprehensive option value
At every expiration date of the option, the government
guarantee value with embedded motivational behaviour
is F1, F2, or 0 for the project company. The project company will exercise a call option or put option according to
actual return. The put option value at each expiry date is:

 V
− r ( T −t ) 
1
F
Ie
=
 N ( d 2 ) − 

 VR−

2r






2r
− 2 +1
σ


V − σ2 +1
V [ N ( d1 ) −
N ( d3 )  ,

VR−


F 2 = λVN ( d1 ) ,

where

When the return of the project company exceeds VR0 , the
project company will gain government motivation λV. At
the expiration date of the option, the call option value is
=
F 2 max ( λV , 0 ) .
Considering the boundary condition and supposing the project company cannot obtain huge profits, after
correction for the initial current value V0, the call option value obtained by the project company is a standard call option. Solving the following model in region
V ≥ VR0 , 0 ≤ t ≤ T :

N ( d 4 )] +

; d 4= d3 + σ T − t .

The call option value at each expiry date is:

Equation (23) is the solution of the put option value
obtained by the project company.
3.3. Solution of the call option


 (T − t )


=
d1

(27)

1 

ln V +  r + σ2  (T − t )
x
1
2 

.
+ ( K + 1) =
2τ
σ T −t
2τ 2
The comprehensive option value is:

F = P1*F 1 + P2 *0 + P3 *F 2 ,

(28)

where P1, P2, P3 is the probability of
VR _ < V ≤ 0, 0 < V < VR0 , VR0 ≤ V < VR .
3.5. Example
A project company granted the right to develop and operate a road, where the initial investment I is 3 billion
RMB and the government guarantee is executed annually. Suppose the volatility rate of the project value is
25% and the risk-free interest rate is 6%. The government promises that the project company will gain 5% of
total annual income as motivation if the annual income
exceeds 1 billion RMB ( VR0 = 10 ). The project company
will obtain a subsidy to meet its losses if its losses are
caused by government public welfare policy and the upper limit of subsidy is 2 billion RMB ( VR− = −20 ). The
government will be relieved of its liability if the losses
exceed the upper limit. The subsidy from the government
is 0 if the income of the project company does not exceed
1 billion and there are no losses caused by government
public welfare policy.
The probability of the annual income reaching 1 billion is 25%, the probability of it not exceeding 0.5 billion
is 55%, the probability of running at a loss because of
government public welfare policy is 20% and the maximum loss is 1.5 billion.
The government guarantee value F gained by the
project company is:
F = 25%*F 1 + 55%*0 + 20%*F 2 = 25%*F 1 + 20%*F 2 ,

(26)

where F1 can be calculated by:

σ2 
 I 
ln  −  −  r +
 (T − t )
2 
 V  
=
d1 =
σ T −t
σ2 
 I 
ln  −  −  r +
 (T − t )

30
0.25 × 0.25 

 
2 
 V 
ln  −
 −  6% +

where: d1 =
;
2
 −15  
 = 2.4076;
σ T −t
0.25
d 2= d1 + σ T − t ;
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d 2= d1 + σ T − t= 2.6576 ;

d3

 V *I  
σ2 
ln  − 2  −  r +
 (T − t )
 VR  
2 
− 

=
σ T −t
450
0.25*0.25 

 
ln 
 −  0.06 +

2
 400  
 = 0.1061;
0.25

d 4= d3 + σ T − =
t 0.3561 ;


 V
− r ( T −t ) 
1
F
Ie
=
 N ( d 2 ) − 

 VR−

 V
V [ N ( d1 ) − 
 VR
 −






−

2r

σ2

+1






−

2r

σ2

+1

N ( d 4 )] +



N ( d3 )  =



30*0.9418*[ 0.996 − 0.64*1.3030] +
15*[ 0.992 − 0.5438*1.3030] =
4.5794 + 4.2514 =
8.8308.
F2 can be calculated as:

1 

ln10 +  r + σ2  (T − t )
1
2 

=
+ ( K + 1) =
=
d1
2τ
σ T −t
2τ 2
2.3026 + 0.3725
= 10.7;
0.25
x

F2 =
λVN ( d1 ) =
0.05*10 *1 =
0.5 .
The comprehensive guarantee value F is:
1

2

F = 25%*F + 55%*0 + 20%*F = 25%*0.8308 +
0.5*20% = 0.23077 billon RMB.

4. Discussion
4.1. The option characteristics of the government
return guarantee
An option is a contract that gives the buyer the right, but
not the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying asset or
instrument at a specified price on or before a specified
date. A real option is a non-financial asset that confers
the option of making a future investment. A real option
is an authority to change behaviour with uncertain factors when decision-making, and the authority is owned by
the project company when it makes long-term investment
decisions. From this point of view, a real option is a kind
of general option (Xiaocheng et al. 2008). The final in-

come of a barrier option depends on not only the price of
the underlying assets on expiration but also the changes
in price over the life of the option, and is determined by
whether or not the underlying security’s price passes a
certain level before the option can be exercised. Therefore, the barrier option is a form of path-dependent option
(Gao et al. 2008). The barrier option can be divided into
two kinds: the knockout option that is extinguished on the
price of the underlying asset breaching a barrier; and the
knock-in option, that becomes available upon the price of
the underlying asset breaching a barrier.
In conditions of uncertain future incomes of the project company, the embedded motivational behaviour government return guarantee has the attributes of a knockin option. When the project company makes a loss due
to government policy, the government compensates the
loss. In this case, the project company actually obtains
a knock-in put option that becomes available when the
project company suffers a loss. When the income of the
project company reaches the threshold value set by the
government, the government will motivate the project
company to some extent. In this case, the project company obtains a knock-in call option, which becomes available when the income of the project company reaches the
threshold value.
Here, V represents project income, T represents the
concession period, VT represents the value of V at the
end of the concession period, VR0 represents the project
income when the income of the project company reaches
the threshold value, VR– represents the maximum compensation that the government can give, and VR’ represents
the secondary threshold value. Supposing the income of
the project company exceeds VR0, the government gives
the project company an extra λ (0 < λ < tax rate) times
of actual income as motivation. F represents the embedded motivational behaviour government guarantee value.
The values of F have a direct relation with VT, as seen
in Table 1.
Table 1. The values of F
Values of VT

Actual income of
Project Company

Values of F

VR _ < VT < 0

0

–VT

0 ≤ VT ≤ VR0

VT

0

VR0 < VT ≤ VR.

VT + λVT

λVT

VT > VR.

VR.

0

When project income is VT < 0 and is caused by
government policy, the government will fulfil its responsibility to compensate the loss in the range of VR− . If
the actual income of the project company is 0, then the
government guarantee value is –VT. When 0 ≤ VT ≤ VR0 ,
the actual income of the project company is VT, then the
government guarantee value is 0. When VR0 < VT ≤ VR' ,
the government motivates the project company with λVT ,
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the actual income of the project company is VT + λVT ,
and the government guarantee value is λVT . When the
actual income of the project company exceeds the secondary threshold value ( VT > VR′ ), the income that exceeds VR′ belongs to the government; therefore, the actual
income of the project companyis VR′ , and the government
guarantee value is 0. So, the actual income of the project
company is max [ 0, VR′ ] , and the government guarantee
value is max [ −VT , 0, λVT ] .
Therefore, when VT < 0, the project company obtains
a put option whose underlying asset is V and expiration
is T. When V R < VT ≤ V R ' , the project company obtains
0
a call option whose underlying asset is V and expiration
is T.
4.2. Advantages of the method
1. Avoiding over guarantee
After analysing more than 1,000 infrastructure concession contracts from 1985 to 2000 in Latin America and
the Caribbean, Guash (2004) found that more than 50%
of power projects and 75% water projects were renegotiated. The major reason for renegotiations is burdensome
debt incurred by the government. Any guarantee promised by ROI is a direct guarantee, with explicit financial
liabilities for the government. Governments should calculate the precise manpower, material and financial resources needed when they decide to make a guarantee.
Furthermore, governments should estimate the costs of
the guarantee and evaluate its value and risks to find a
balance between the benefits and risks involved (GriffithJones, de Lima 2004). Government guarantees must meet
the needs of the market and government financial capacity. It also requires that a reasonable guarantee threshold
is pre-established. When the project is guaranteed by a
floating ROI, although the ROI is made quite clear, the
final value of the guarantee is directly associated with
other factors such as purchases or sales of production/service, so its exact value cannot be pre-calculated. Once the
government makes a wrong forecast of the future market,
the government can incur a heavy financial liability (Li,
Tao 2014). This study proposes a new method that abandons the minimum ROI by using an exact value from
the combined calculations based on different probabilities
of different profit levels, which provides a quantitative
description of the future market uncertainties. Because
the guarantee value is made clearly, the government can
avoid making a guarantee that is beyond its financial capacity.
2. Avoiding hold-up problems and making responsibilities
clear in the government guarantee
When there is a government guarantee for an infrastructure project, the government has an information
advantage in the project quality requirements, and market
demand and private investors have information advantage in capital and technology. The government may be

locked into an infrastructure project by private investors
using opportunistic behaviours to maximise their benefits
(Tiong 1997; Li et al. 2013). If the government is locked
in, great fiscal subsidies may be generated. Although fiscal subsidies are a financial burden on the local economy, the probability of local government cancelling the
contract is very small (Yang, Liu 2005). Because of this
small probability, the project company has little risk and
the situation may occur where it is over subsidised by
the local government guarantee. The investment decision
is partially based on the government ROI guarantee and
not on any scientific feasibility analysis and ROI forecast.
This can cause a high coordination cost, low management
efficiency and operation profit (Hu 2007). This study proposes a new method that abandons the ROI approach.
The project company is unable to hold-up the government
without ROI. Another advantage of this method is that it
clarifies the responsibilities of the local government and
project company. Because it has no possibility of holding
up the government, the project company can only focus
on the risks in infrastructure construction, operation and
maintenance. The government bears the social risk, political risk, legal policy risk and other risks that are not controlled by market behaviour. This accords with the principle that risk allocation should be carried out with minimal
risk control cost (Ahwireng-Obeng, Mokgohlwa 2002).
3. Motivate the project company effectively
The float ROI guarantee is a limited motivational
mode that is most effective only when the expected revenue is between the upper limit and lower limits of the
investment return. There is no motivational effort at other
expected revenue levels, which are detrimental for local
government (Zhang, Guo 2009). Viewed from the local
government’s standpoint, failed infrastructure projects
always lead to serious social and political effects. Local government focuses on how to avoid mistakes and
the failure of infrastructure projects (Salman et al. 2007).
These public and socio-economic effects caused by infrastructure projects are considered to be concerned with
social value (Cheah, Liu 2006). Viewed from the standpoint of the project company, economic value is reflected
in the continued cash flow generated by the project. The
value of an infrastructure project is therefore one of social value and economic value. Local government and
private investors have different emphases on infrastructure project value that are difficult to balance. The return
revenue guarantees provided by the local government can
increase both economic value and social value, although
this additional value is often ignored or estimated subjectively (Cheah, Liu 2006; Chiara, Garvin 2007). The
real option method adopted by this study provides an
analytic solution that includes this additional value and
can motivate investment from private investors (Mason,
Baldwin 1988; Wang et al. 2006). Furthermore, the proposed method considers the factors affecting the project
company’s level of effort. If the project company’s return
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level is more than the secondary threshold, the motivation
mode is revenue sharing. In this mode, the benefits of private investors and local government are consistent with
each other. The more effort made by the project company,
the more return gained by local government and the project company. The project company will therefore do its
best to lower the cost coefficient with these sharing rules,
as this mode of revenue sharing has proved to be an effective motivation mode in the past (Zhang, Guo 2009).
4.3. Limitations of the study
There are two main limitations of this study. The first
is how to determine the probability of each return level.
The study first introduces a combined calculation method
based on the probabilities of different project company
returns. It can avoid the uncertain factors of surrounding
future changes in the market and can provide an exact
value. The highlighted issue in negotiation will transform
the approach from one of minimum ROI to the probabilities for each level of return. One way to acquire the
probabilities needed is in analysing statistical data from
similar projects in the same region. Local government
has an absolute information advantage, which is unfair to
private/non-government investors. The second limitation
is that it is difficult to find practical cases to analyse. This
is the first time a method has been presented to determine
the government guarantee value using probabilities of different levels of return, and therefore there is no historical probability data available. It is also difficult to obtain
infrastructure information such as guaranteed value and
minimum ROI from Chinese local governments. According to the Regulation of the People’ Republic of China on
the Disclosure of Government Information (State Council
of the People’s Republic of China 2007) and Guideline
on Carrying out Public-Private-Partnership (National
Development and Reform Commission of China 2014),
such information is considered to be confidential as the
believes its disclosure creates a big disadvantage in future
negotiations. The study presents a method that will provide an analytic solution through strict mathematical derivation that is appropriate for the existing circumstances
in China. Future research will be aimed at developing the
method in the light of the prevailing situation in other
countries.

Conclusions
This paper proposes a new return guarantee approach
with embedded motivational behaviour. ROs theory is
used to build an option pricing model and the model’s
feasibility is verified by an example. This is a theoretical supplement to real option theory applied to PPP urban infrastructure procurement. A systematic method is
provided to determine the government’s guaranteed ROI
value, which can provide practical application guidelines
for the development of future government policy.
Although the guarantee model proposed does not
have the lower limit return guarantee that is always prom-
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ised in the float return guarantee model, it also has no upper limit return and the project company will obtain extra
return when the income reaches the motivation threshold.
This extra return plays an active role in improving the
operation performance of the project company and therefore improving the efficiency and quality of infrastructure provision. The no lower limit return has a positive
effect on lessening the financial burden of the government. The government is not responsible for lower limit
returns and avoids contingent liability. The government
only compensates the project company when it makes a
loss that is due to government policy. The motivation factor has a positive effect on increasing the government’s
revenue. When the income of the project company reaches the motivational threshold, although the government
provides the project company with extra income, it also
gains tax revenues because of the higher returns of the
project company:
1. The proposed guarantee model has no lower ROI
limit. If the government promises a lower ROI limit,
there are at least two problems: the first is that the
government would have a contingent liability; the
second is that financial pressure on the government
may be increased, because if the actual ROI is lower
than lower limit, the project company will lose their
operational incentive. To solve this problem, there is
no lower limit of ROI in the embedded motivational
behaviour government return guarantee model. Because there is no lower ROI limit, the government
does not need to bear the financial pressure. However, the government will provide compensation if
the project company makes a loss due to government
policy.
2. The model sets a threshold value in place of an ROI
upper limit. The rational goal of private sector investors is to maximise profit and, provided they are
legitimate businesspersons and do nothing to harm
the public interest, a high-income level is tolerated
in China. If there is an ROI upper limit, the investors only obtain income between the lower and upper limits, which restricts the project company’s entrepreneurial operating capabilities and possibly a
recourse to controlling the actual ROI at or below
the upper limit by reducing operating efficiency, affecting the quality of urban infrastructure supply. To
solve this problem, there is no ROI upper limit in
the embedded motivational behaviour government
return guarantee model. Instead, there is a threshold
value such that, when it is exceeded by the actual
ROI, the project company will not only receive their
normal profit but also gain an extra reward. Thus, on
one hand, the government can obtain revenue from
the project income tax at the same time as motivating the project company to gain extra income by
going beyond the incentive threshold.
3. To prevent the project company from acquiring huge
profits, there is a second threshold value set by the
government so that, when the actual ROI exceeds
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this value, the extra income is diverted to the government. Because of the public nature of urban infrastructure, however, the probability of the project
company obtaining a huge profit is very low and so
the assumption made here is that the project ROI is
always lower than the second threshold.
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